Major-General Gordon Maitland
Picture credit: Tim Anderson, Charles Miranda and the Daily Telegraph.
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The United Services Institute presents
the Blamey Oration biannually in conjunction with the Field
Marshall Sir Thomas Blamey Memorial Fund. The oration
perpetuates the memory of Sir Thomas Blamey, Australia’s
highest ranking serviceman and, arguably, its greatest
soldier. In this oration, which marks the 54th
anniversary of the death of the Field Marshal on 27 May
1951, General Maitland reviews several controversial
relationships and events in Blamey’s career and, in seeking
to set the record straight, presents new evidence from his
own research on the Kokoda campaign.
I’m somewhat overwhelmed to see this
impressive attendance and I thank you all for making the
effort which, in a way, is a tribute to Blamey. The Blamey
Oration is intended to foster debate on key military and
strategic issues, but I feel that from time to time our
attention should return to the man himself.
As I note that many of you are my friends, I would
additionally thank you for your loyalty. I am thus
emboldened to make an unusual request
Would you please
expunge from your memories your past reading and list today
with a completely open mind. Why? You might well ask. |
Because to an extent you have been influenced
by writers who have allowed themselves to be influenced. They have
done well in bringing us splendid descriptions of terrain, events
and experiences, but some have produced conclusions beyond their
competence to make. Think of all that has been written about the
Kokoda Trail, including the published deductions, conclusions and
accusations. Yet you will fail to find any worthwhile analysis of
the conduct of operations.
Also, the influences which shape a commander’s decisions range
well beyond those that can later be identified by historians, some
of whom lack understanding of the culture of the army. Even when
comprehensive information is held, judgments will usually be
subjective – was a heavy penalty motivated by vindictiveness, or
was it simply warranted in the circumstances of the time? Early
in his career (1978) our eminent military historian Professor
David Horner wrote of ‘the necessity for a great deal of evidence
to ensure that reputations are not disparaged unfairly’ – but did
other authors read that? I think not!
Interpretation of Australian military events of sixty-odd years
ago was unfortunately shaped by the only first hand account of a
senior officer that was available for many years – General
Rowell’s 1974 autobiography. Not surprisingly, he presented
himself in a very favourable light and succeeded in tarnishing the
image of Blamey, who was no longer alive to provide his version –
not that he would have chosen so to do. The book was so santised
that it doesn’t mention Rowell’s removal of Potts from command of
the 21st Brigade.
Generals have special problems; they operate in a complex
political environment under unique stresses which can be fully
appreciated only by those who have had the experience. Whereas a
battalion commander is only accountable to his brigade commander,
General Blamey was accountable to his military commander, to his
Minister for the Army (Forde), to his Prime Minister (Curtin), and
to some other ministers. The media and subsequently the public
thought he was accountable to them too. There are those at lower
ranks who may choose to play politics, but general is the rank at
which soldierly forthrightness is not enough. Examples are not
hard to find. Consider the case of General Bennett. General
Sturdee, the Chief of the General Staff, advised Blamey that he
had misgivings about Bennett’s escape from Singapore, prompting
Blamey to decide to convene an inquiry. However, on that very same
day Bennett was commended by the Minister for the Army who,
considering himself senior to Blamey, was always loath to consult
him. In the circumstances, Prime Minister Curtin, obviously
concerned about public reaction, told Blamey to desist. Political
considerations will usually override military ones. Later, when
General Percival (Bennett’s commander in Malaya) criticized
Bennett’s departure from Singapore, Blamey was obliged to hold an
inquiry.
An American general once said: ‘The higher I climb the ladder
the more ‘arse’ people see to kick’. I accept that
responsibility has to be taken for errors and omissions; however
it is inappropriate that criticism of generals is usually freely
expressed without a sense of proportion being exposed.
Setting the Record Straight
Moving on to the actual topic, you will be aware that it is 60
years since the end of the Second World War. Last year various
ex-service organizations were considering what the focus of this
year should be. My friend (a member present here today) John
Allen, the son of famous Major General Tubby Allen, suggested that
it should be ‘Setting the Record Straight’. That is something that
hopefully, this talk may help to achieve – but in respect of Field
Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey, someone whom John Allen is unlikely to
have in mind.
To a minor extent, I am moved to do so by a feeling of guilt. I
was a 19-year old sergeant when Blamey flew into my brigade. It
took absolutely no time for the news to circulate that he had
brought ‘some grog for the officers’. It is incredible to look
back and remember how bitterly that news was received. To my
discredit, I joined in the condemnation of Blamey. It was a
reflection of how successful the media had been in poisoning
people’s minds about him. Quite obviously he couldn’t bring liquor
for the whole brigade and it was a courteous and thoughtful act to
bring it for those with whom he would be spending the night. He
was better received in places where officers had taken the trouble
to brief the troops: this was particularly so when Blamey was
being attacked by the politicians – a group not held in high
esteem by Australian soldiers. Indeed, soldiers had a lot for
which to be thankful to Blamey, as his consideration of them was
outstanding. At the very start of the war, he had told his senior
officers that he had selected them ‘because I think you will
look after the troops. This is my chief concern.’ I have
read criticism of even that praiseworthy comment, which indicates
the extent to which even thinking people have allowed themselves
to be prejudiced.
As this sad story progresses you will come to realize what an
undeservedly maligned person Blamey was. The media were the
principal offenders for two simple reasons – bad stories sell
papers; and Blamey’s peccadilloes set him up as an easy target.
About
Blamey
As this is about Blamey a brief description is warranted. He was
born near Wagga Wagga in 1884, one of ten children of a drover (he
obviously didn’t drove enough!). He became a teacher, and, as an
additional activity, he became a cadet officer. This led him to
the regular army and to his being the first Australian to pass
Staff College examinations. This took him to Quetta in India and,
when the Great War commenced, to appointment as a major on the
headquarters of the Australian Imperial Force’s (AIF) famous 1st
Division. He landed at Anzac at 7.20 a.m. on 25 April 1915, and
the official historian, Bean commended his work and bravery. He
went on to be a brigadier and Monash’s highly regarded chief staff
officer on the Australian Corps in 1918.
Subsequently he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In 1925,
he left the army to become Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police;
however, he served on in the militia. Although he was obliged to
resign from the police in 1936, he was Menzies’ choice in 1939 as
the commander of the 2nd AIF.
He had a unique presence, some say ‘radiating power’, and, in
1942, he was recalled from the Middle East to Australia to the new
position of commander-in-chief of the Australian Army, which he
steered to reach a peak of 14 divisions. It may surprise you to
know that 1 in 10 Australians served under him. Almost on his
death bed, he was appointed Field Marshal.
Blamey’s Dark Side
Blamey has his shortcomings: he drank heavily, but not so as to
detract from his work (one of his aides said he had ‘the body of a
bull’ and quite clearly he had incredible stamina), and he enjoyed
amorous adventures. When he decided ‘to party’, he would have no
compunction about doing so at a night club where he would be
rubbing shoulders with junior officers. But as Prime Minister
Curtin said to the press on 17 July 1942: ‘When Blamey was
appointed, the government was seeking a military leader, not a
Sunday School teacher’.
It did not help that Blamey, while Chief Commissioner of the
Victoria Police, had his name linked to a brothel raid and, later
had been forced to resign for having released information which he
knew to be untrue. Blamey placed loyalty very high in his rating
of personal qualities and his problems in the police force arose
from his being too loyal and
endeavouring to protect
the reputation of others.
Blamey’s ‘Achilles’ Heel’ was his complete disregard for what
others thought about him. His concern for his troops was
outstanding, but he never sought their approbation; he treated
Forde, the Minister for Defence, with contempt (but this started
with Forde, not Blamey); and completely neglected public
relations. But this was also his strength – in the Middle East he
fought so strongly (and loyally to his government and the
Australian Army) that he confided to his friend Major General
Burston that he was ‘the most hated man
in the
Middle East’.
Notwithstanding, both of his principal opponents, Wavell and
Auchinleck, held him in high regard – this according to Lord Casey
and Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. Wavell referred to him as the
‘best soldier in the
Middle East’.
The Media
Returning to the media; their campaign against him started when he
fought with characteristic vigour,
but with characteristic tactlessness, to protect the Victoria
Police. Smith’s Weekly described the campaign as ‘the
most sensational ever conducted by the regimented Press against a
public official’. Famous correspondent, Chester Wilmot, added
fuel when Blamey received command of the 2nd AIF;
Wilmot referred to him as a ‘crook’, and circulated a story
of Blamey getting a commission from a laundry contract. Later, in
reporting the Greek campaign, he ignored Blamey’s farsightedness
in identifying the evacuation beaches, gave Rowell the credit for
the withdrawal and claimed that Blamey left Greece early
‘against the advice and in spite of pleading of his senior
officers’ – this despite General Wavell having ordered Blamey
to leave and General Wilson having dismissed Blamey’s protests.
Wilmot later raised rumours of Blamey profiting from picture
contracts and canteens, but never had any evidence for his
accusations. Indeed, in any rebuttal is needed, it can be found in
Blamey’s rejection of a very large sum of money to write his
memoirs, because, as he explained: ‘They would inevitably
damage reputations’. On 4 July 1942, Smith’s Weekly
went so far as to advocate firing Blamey.
At war’s end The Bulletin of 12 December 1945, finally extended an
apology to Blamey. It stated:
“He was watched continually by an unfriendly
press bent upon commanding his army for him and upon assuring that
he should not be accorded any of the privileges which commanders
normally are accorded by common consent in progress of keeping
their health and comfort.” It added: “[He] gave Australia equable
military leadership, and he did it without the unfaltering support
of Ministers, press or public. On the contrary, strong influences
were at work all the time to divide him from his troops, to
undermine his authority over them, even to incite their derision
of him”
Adverse publicity was such that only for a few
short periods was Blamey able to operate without the likelihood of
his being dismissed. However, he did make it and thus became the
Allies’ only commander who kept his command from the start of the
war to the finish.
The
Senior Officers
Sowing the rumours and the seeds of dissension was an incredible
collection of senior officers. Discipline is the cornerstone of
military forces yet this strange group obviously thought that
stopped with the troops. As distinguished historian Jeffrey Grey
wrote: ‘[A]t times, it must be wondered whether some of
Australia’s senior officers ever put as much energy into fighting
the Germans and Japanese as they did into quarrelling with one
another.’ Such rivalries were not unique to Australia; that
between MacArthur and the United States Navy was worse, and, if
reports be true, inter-service rivalry in Japan was even more so.
Most historians refer to staff corps versus militia rivalry but,
as senior officers sought to achieve their own advancement, both
the staff corps and the militia showed no reluctance to denigrate
their own. The so called ‘revolt of the general’ (regular and
militia) was aimed at Lavarack (a regular) and Bennett (a
militiaman). Senior officers should be ambitious, but it should be
a matter more of hoping to receive acknowledgment as a result of
performance, rather than agitating or, even worse, conniving, for
it.
It gives me no pleasure to talk in the following terms about a
former Chief of the General Staff, but Rowell’s behaviour towards
Blamey was appalling, and it is no less appalling that many have
glossed over it. When Blamey told Rowell (his principal staff
officer) that he had been ordered out of Greece, Rowell responded ‘I don’t believe you’. Rowell’s conduct permeated the
headquarters, and he later spread the story that ‘Blamey showed
the white feather and ran out of the country in a plane’. |
General McArthur
|
General Lavarack seized on that and so the damage to Blamey
spread. That Rowell continued his denigration of Blamey in
correspondence with Vasey was unpardonable disloyalty, as was his
later lack of balance towards Blamey in New Guinea. He used terms
like ‘crafty gangster’ and ‘evil cancer’ in
referring to Blamey. He wrote to another general (Clowes) that
‘I would never have believed a senior officer would have taken
what I said to him’. Yet, in his autobiography, Rowell accuses
Blamey of magnifying his remarks when reporting to the Prime
Minister.
Apropos Rowell’s accusation of cowardice; history makes it clear
that Blamey performed with great gallantry on Gallipoli, and there
is overwhelming evidence that his moral courage was second to
none. Quite obviously Wavell couldn’t afford to risk the capture
of Australia’s top soldier and Rowell’s inability to recognize
that situation and other incidents suggest that he lacked
politico-military awareness.
It was shrewd of Rowell to write his own biography for it
obviously dissuaded today’s critical military historians from
undertaking the task. Rowell makes much of the 25th
Brigade not arriving in Papua until 7 September 1942 (he wrote
that they ‘could have been in New Guinea in July or even in
June’), yet he would have been aware that Blamey was following
MacArthur’s wishes for the experienced 7th Division to
be kept for his future offensive operations; also on 21 August
1942 Rowell told Blamey that he didn’t want the 25th
Brigade; he only asked for it on 2 September, implying that up
until then he had seen his forces as adequate. His friend, Vasey,
saw him becoming ‘a bit full of himself’, and it is clear that
Rowell was intent on bringing Blamey down, showing no gratitude
whatsoever to his mentor who, in October 1939, had picked him out
as a lieutenant colonel, and had made him into a lieutenant
general by April 1942. The sheer total of Blamey’s achievements
proves Rowell to have been malignantly biased, and it is my belief
that critical study would reveal Rowell as a character quite
different form the victim popularly portrayed.
Blamey is accused of being a ‘hater’, but two months after the
Greek campaign he had sent back splendid competence reports
on Rowell and also on Bridgeford, who had also passed some
denigrating remarks.
Later both Generals Vasey and Robertson would go behind Blamey’s
back and cause problems for him as they endeavoured to advance
themselves, yet they trusted Blamey – everyone did. That was one
of the keys to Blamey’s success. Everyone respected his judgments;
they trusted him, so that there was wholehearted support for his
plans and the Australian Army found a confidence that played a
large part in its success.
Surely what MacArthur told Prime Minister Curtin on 17 July 1942
said it all. Curtin wrote:
“General MacArthur said that had heard much
loose talk from some people about General Blamey and he regretted
to say that much of it had originated from officers in the
Australian Army. Other Australian officers coveted the post of
Commander-in-Chief and had made representations against General
Blamey. He had also received anonymous letters on the subject.’
Having said that, MacArthur was playing his own
game.
General
MacArthur and his Cohorts
General MacArthur had been an abysmal failure in the Philippines,
but was theatrical, egoistic, and dedicated to his own self-aggrandisement,
never allowing truth to stand in the way. Many of MacArthur’s
press releases were not only distortions of fact, but fictitious,
prompting Jack Galloway, in his illuminating book The Odd
Couple, to dub them ‘Ripping Yarns’. When General Eisenhower
(later U.S. President) was asked whether he knew MacArthur, he
replied: ‘Yes, I studied drama under him
for some years.’
Although Australians in senior positions held prudish reservations
about Blamey, they were completely unconcerned about MacArthur,
whose private life was scarcely less sullied; and who turned a
blind eye to his senior American officers not only living with
Australian mistresses but putting them on the payroll, which
incidentally was met by Australia.
The government was without moral fibre, was frantic, and
was amateurish. It completely surrendered to MacArthur, handing
operational control of Australian armed forces to a foreigner and
abrogating Australian contribution to strategic direction –
incredible acts for which Shedden must share the blame. (Shedden
was the Defence Secretary, whom I will describe later). In an
historical article, on 6 December 1972, the Sydney Morning Herald
put the government’s sycophantic approach to MacArthur in these
words: ‘You take over what you need of
the entire resources of the country and we will have what you
leave’. |
General MacArthur
|
Unfortunately MacArthur was haunted by his failure in the
Philippines and his humiliating departure from Corregidor; as a
consequence he was fanatical about re-conquering those islands.
The United States Navy, on the other hand, was no less haunted by
the humiliation that had been inflicted on it at Pearl Harbour,
and also was bent on a redemptive crusade. It became a race, and
MacArthur was almost paranoiac in wanting to win the right to the
starting position for the liberation of the Philippines. His
consequent ruthlessness did not meet the standards Australians
look for in their leaders. Stephen Taafe wrote regarding the loss
of American lives at Wadke-Sarmi: ‘MacArthur sacrificed those
men not so much to win the war as to win his race with the Navy’.
In was in MacArthur’s interests to keep the Australian Government
under pressure, and he didn’t want any interference from Blamey
who seemed to be the only one to realize that MacArthur had no
interest in Australia’s future, only in his own. On the other
hand, he saw Blamey as far superior to the other Australian
generals and he needed both Blamey and the Australian Army in
order to achieve his aims. Being devious, he worked to retain
Blamey, but to curb him. In particular he was a master of public
relations and was determined that all good publicity would go to
himself.
Blamey served MacArthur loyally, but MacArthur would repay his
loyalty only so far as it suited himself. MacArthur was
responsible for Blamey being sent to Papua by Prime Minister
Curtin, to be the scapegoat in the event of an adverse outcome
there, and later he worked to delay Blamey’s return to Australia.
Later still, as American strength built up and reliance on the
Australian Army reduced, MacArthur sidelined Blamey as much as
possible ‘by stealth and by the employment of subterfuges that
were undignified and at times absurd’ – the official
historian’s words. However it must be conceded that MacArthur was
acting in accordance with guidance he had received from
Washington.
(CIC Prods. Note:
During the course of our research for our film we discovered proof
that General MacArthur lied to Prime Minister Curtin when he said
that it was the order of the US President and the US Joint Chiefs
that Blamey be sent to New Guinea. It was, in fact, MacArthur who
insisted Blamey go there, he asked only that President Truman and
General George C. Marshall to endorse his decision.)
Curtin had given MacArthur complete control over the media and he
took full advantage of it. All successes were attributed to
‘Allied Forces’, even if there had been no Americans there, and
MacArthur was presented as the successful general. Favourable
mention was never made of Blamey or other Australian generals; but
in this MacArthur was even handed – he never mentioned his own
generals either. It was the opposite when there was hint of events
not so favourable. MacArthur never accepted blame for anything and
was always quick to identify scapegoats. In Papua, it was the
Australians, notwithstanding that he owed everything to them. When
Shedden asked MacArthur why the beachheads campaign had lasted so
long he quickly blamed Blamey. It follows that while MacArthur
ensured that Blamey survived, his manipulation of publicity
tarnished Blamey’s image even further.
You will be aware that MacArthur finally got his comeuppance; he
was fired during the Korean War by President Truman, who observed
(and I don’t want the admirals here to smirk):
“I fired him because he wouldn’t respect the
authority of the President. I didn’t fire him because he was a
dumb son-of-a-bitch, although he was, but that’s not against the
law for Generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would
be in jail.”
Truman seems to have disliked generals even
more that Prime Minister Curtin.
The
Politicians
Before Curtin came to office Menzies was prime minister, and it
was Menzies who appointed Blamey to command the second AIF.
Thereby, Blamey was prejudiced in the eyes of the opposition Labor
Party. The trade union movement had already found against Blamey
because of his handling of strikes when Police Commissioner and,
as the movement was closely linked to the Labor Party, Blamey was
left with ground to make up when the party achieved government.
Needless to say, it was not Blamey’s style to endeavour to do so.
What is more, Curtin, the new prime minister, was a reformed
alcoholic and, as although puritanical, had been jailed for his
conduct as a pacifist – hardly the qualities that would appeal to
Blamey; or vice versa.
As Blamey stood head and shoulders above his competitors, Curtin
had no choice other than to appoint Blamey as Australian
commander-in-chief; however, it was a qualified appointment – the
Defence Department was given the responsibility for war policy,
and the War Conference which Curtin established, comprised only
himself, MacArthur and the manipulative Shedden. What was worse,
as mentioned earlier, MacArthur was given supreme command of the
Australian services and control of the media.
It is interesting to speculate how another general might have
fared, but the hierarchical system of the army was an anathema to
the Labor Party and it is unlikely that another would have been
received significantly better. Apart from a short period of two
years the Labor Party had been in the political wilderness, so
that it brought no experience to its new role. In addition, its
members had been opposed not only to military service but to the
military system, so that they lacked basic military knowledge –
this in the middle of a war with the nation in crisis. Little
wonder that The Bulletin chose to describe them as ‘a
government of novices’.
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Blamey with MacArthur |
In February 1942, Curtin earned a reputation for being an
outstanding wartime leader by standing firm against Churchill and
insisting on the return to Australia of the 6th and 7th
Divisions. In fact he had little choice; it is said that his Chief
of the General Staff had threatened to resign if he didn’t, and
some of his ministers (plus many others) were in a state of funk.
Not long after, when the news from Kokoda was at its worst,
Beasley, the minister for Supply and Shipping, in his agitation,
called out: ‘Moresby is going to fall. Send Blamey up there
and let him fall with it.’ At MacArthur’s opportunistic
suggestion and in ignorance of what a commander-in-chief’s job
entailed, that is exactly what Curtin did – sent him to Moresby.
If credit should go to anyone for how an ill-prepared and
dispirited Australia emerged from its greatest crises, it should
go to its battle winning soldiers, under the command of Blamey.
The government could scarcely have been more loyal to and
supportive of MacArthur; and consequently belittling of Blamey.
Even in January 1945, when suppression of news about the
Australian Army was a major concern, acting Prime Minister Chifley
would not approach MacArthur to loosen his stranglehold on the
media. Rather, an attack was launched at Blamey. This was the
government which had cut Blamey off from the media, yet it was
Calwell, the then Minister for Information, who told the media
that Blamey was to blame. It was all too much for Blamey, who, in
his best public relations manner, called him a liar! Not
withstanding, even Calwell was constrained to say: ‘The next man
to Blamey is like a curate to a bishop’.
MacArthur continued to bamboozle the government. When his Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Washington were reluctant to approve his
Australian-manned Balikpapan invasion, he sold it to them by
saying that cancellation would produce ‘grave repercussions
with the Australian government and people’. Yet, when Blamey
finally prodded Chifley to query MacArthur about the expedition,
the misleading answer that it had been ‘ordered by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff’ not only mollified Chifley but increased the
lack of confidence in Blamey.
The government was never wholeheartedly behind Blamey and the
continuing thought given to his replacement, even though it never
happened, was so well known that it detracted from Blamey’s
achievements which, clearly, the ‘government of novices’
had never paused to appreciate. There were always people, like
Shedden, volunteering comments on military matters, and the
government was only too willing to listen.
Tom Blamey in New Guinea |
The six months following 27 March 1942, when Blamey took up his
appointment, are revealing. The pre-war Military Board had failed
abysmally in preparing the Australian Army for war, and the
enormity of Blamey’s job was beyond imagination. The army had to
be restructured and reorganized and the arrival of American troops
in large numbers had to be absorbed. The AIF had been used to
being looked after by the British and the new need to be
self-sufficient created tremendous logistical, communication,
training, intelligence and security pressures; munitions also were
a major difficulty and every step had financial ramifications. In
addition, much was happening – air and submarine attacks, the war
in the north, and the never ending conferences (particularly those
demanded by the politicians). At the same time, Blamey was
commanding Allied Land Forces in which role he had to cope with
MacArthur’s paranoia about beating the United States Navy. Victory
in the 4 June Battle of Midway ended the possibility of an assault
against Australia, and attention was concentrated on New Guinea.
There, by the end of August, the Battle of Milne Bay had been won
and the only problem was the Kokoda Trail. Despite the
Australian’s steady retreat, the forces that Blamey had assembled
allowed no possibility of defeat, as Blamey assured the Advisory
War Council. The trouble was that the government’s inexperience
and alarm was too deep-seated and, when MacArthur expressed
concern, the politicians turned on Blamey.
The end result was, as mentioned earlier, Curtin’s 17 September
dispatch of Blamey to Port Moresby. Then, adding to that
disgraceful decision, Curtin told the media that he had sent
Blamey to New Guinea ‘to give him one final chance’. To
denigrate and undermine his commander-in-chief in that completely
undeserved way was shameful.
|
But even worse was in store when Curtin became ill, for Chifley,
Dr Evatt and others saw the army as a fascist organization and
Blamey as having the worst characteristics of that regime.
Finally, Forde, the Minister for the Army, vented his spite when
he gave little notice for Blamey in retiring him after the war.
Blamey, not to be outdone and ‘still the diplomat’, left Forde in
no doubt as to what he thought of him and his government – and
little wonder!
The
Civilian Bureaucracy
Firmly in command of the civilian defence bureaucracy was Sir
Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department of Defence from
1937 to 1956. He believed himself to be a military and strategic
expert, not by virtue of a six months stint overseas in the Great
War as a lieutenant in the Pay Corps, but by his attendance at the
Imperial Defence College.
He was a great admirer of the British way and was a disciple of
his British counterpart, Sir Maurice Hankey; so much so that he
was cleverly dubbed by some wit as ‘the pocket hanky’.
Hanky taught Shedden how to wield power behind the scenes. It was
Shedden who had been a strong advocate of the Singapore strategy,
despite a convincing criticism of it by the Australian Army but,
in the manner of MacArthur, he succeeded in putting the blame on
Britain when the Australian Army was proved correct and Singapore
‘came tumbling down’.
Shedden was one who swallowed MacArthur’s public relations ‘hook,
line and sinker’, going so far as to commend MacArthur’s inspiring
defence of the Philippines. He didn’t seek to talk to United
States High Commissioner Sayre, who was evacuated to Australia en
route to the United States, and who was embittered against
MacArthur. Perhaps Shedden knew on what side his bread was
buttered, for his later knighthood was probably due to MacArthur’s
suggestion to Curtin.
Professor David Horner’s biography of Shedden, Defence Supremo,
reveals him to be untruthful when it suited and dedicated to
‘blowing his own trumpet’. Indicative of how Shedden was; he
persuaded the government to request a Royal Air Force officer to
inspect and report on the Royal Australian Air Force without
telling the[Australian] Chief of the Air Staff.
It is intriguing that the Curtin government had MacArthur and
Shedden knighted, but not one Australian serviceman.
There is no denying that Shedden was a most capable and hard
working public servant, but like all in the senior bureaucracy, he
had an appetite for power. I give you that background so that you
may better understand when I tell you that he adopted the same
tactics as MacArthur to Blamey – keep him, but in an inferior
role.
General Wynter wrote of the civil staff:
“They take any and every opportunity to oppose
the Commander-in-Chief. This has been their attitude virtually
since November 1942 when Sinclair [the Secretary of the Army]
first started his intrigue for replacing the C-in-C by an Army
Council.”
Authors
It is interesting that authors have never
wanted to pick up the odd supportive remark about Blamey. For
example, were you aware that on Armistice Day (11 November) Blamey
would arrive at his office early, close the door, and live with
his thoughts until after 11 a.m.? Doesn’t that reveal a person
different from the one usually painted? David Horner is an
exception; in his valuable book, Crisis of Command, he
says: ‘Blamey always felt a certain loyalty to those officers
who had served their country long and well, and through no fault
of their own found themselves in situations that they were not
equipped to handle’.
Consider all the authors who have written about the Kokoda
Trail. They are numerous, and everyone maligns Blamey, but based
on what evidence? Remember that books, like newspapers, need to
‘spiced up’ to boost sales.
And what about the furore
over Blamey’s remarks to the 21st Brigade at Koitaki
after the decimated brigade was withdrawn from the Kokoda Trail.
Sadly, there is no proof of what Blamey said, but surely the first
source one would go to would be the commander of the brigade. Yet
no one ever asked Sir Ivan Dougherty. Ivan was my friend, and some
will recall my giving the eulogy at his funeral. In his
‘recollections’ he wrote:
“In other parts of this narrative I have
indicated that I am firm in my opinion that General Blamey’s
comments on the parade at Koitaki were given the wrong
interpretation. I was alert in carefully listening to what he
said.
He did use the term ‘rabbits’, but as I stood
on parade I did not anticipate that the men of 21 Brigade would
give his words the interpretation that he said the troops of 21
Brigade had ‘run like rabbits’. He said the Jap had animal-like
instincts. He said that while they stayed in their holes they
would shoot anyone who moved near them. He said it was like
shooting rabbits back home – we had to get them out of their
burrows before we could get them.
General Blamey said words to the effect that:
‘Brigadier Doughery has had troops under his command of whom he
has every reason to be intensely proud, and I know he will be just
as proud of the men of 21 Brigade’. Perhaps it might have been
better if he had mentioned the men of 21 Brigade first, saying
something like: ‘I know Brigadier Doughery will be intensely proud
of the men of 21 Brigade just as he has been intensely proud of
the men he has commanded previously.
In General Vasey’s war by David Horner, on page
220, it is written: ‘Back in Port Moresby MacArthur and Blamey
were in deep discussion about which formation to send, the 127th
U.S. Regiment, the 21st Brigade under Ivan Dougherty,
or perhaps the 41st U.S. Division from Australia.
Blamey told MacArthur that ‘he would rather put in more
Australians, as he knew they would fight’. MacArthur therefore
agreed to fly in the 21st Brigade.
This would most certainly appear to support my
contention that General Blamey’s address at the Koitaki Parade has
been misconstrued.”
Your Conclusion
It is difficult to know to whom to give
the last word. General Eather was one of the brigadiers
harried by Blamey on the Kokoda Trail, yet he wrote to his
parents: ‘To me it is disgraceful to think that a great
man who has done what he has for Australia in the last six
years should be open to attacks as he has been’.
Then there was General Morsehead. Curtin had chosen him as a
successor to Blamey ‘should unfortunately anything happen
to him’ [like being ‘fired’] Moreshead, when told, wrote
to Curtin: ‘I do sincerely trust that the occasion will
not arise. General Blamey is truly great Commander and it
would be a national calamity if he were to become a
casualty.’
Perhaps the most significant tribute was paid by MacArthur –
not in his memoirs in which he used the words ‘of highest
quality’ to describe Blamey, but by his 1948 action in
inviting Blamey to visit him in Japan, a very rare act of
gratitude completely out of character with MacArthur’s
normal conduct.
Today’s topic does not lend itself to spelling out either
Blamey’s successes or his mistakes. If your interest has
been whetted, then read David Horner’s biography. However,
it may help you to understand the man better if I mention
the following:
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Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey
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His whole military career was characterized
by his concern for Australian lives and interests.
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Monash, who knew him as well as anyone,
described his mind as ‘prehensile’. For example, it was he who,
on Gallipoli, immediately perceived the potential of the
periscope rifle.
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He and Monash conceived the first modern
battle – Hamel, which changed the conduct of war.
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He thought and spoke about the future of
Australia. The Australian National University was one of his
brainchilds.
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The steps he took on the health front were
quite outstanding. His seeking for advice; and willingness to
implement unusual measures beat malaria. He even brought Lord
Florey to Australia.
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He was behind the emphasis on training and
the creation of training facilities which played a major part in
the success of the Australian Army.
The question you might wish to address is –
what motivated him? There are those who focus on his private life
and believe he lusted for power and the trappings that accompanied
it. Others believe he was a patriot, who stuck to the job,
despite his abominable treatment, because of his dedication to the
army and his determination to preserve it from mishandling by a
lesser person.
The subjective
judgement is one for you
to make; however whatever conclusion you reach, you must also
conclude that we were extremely fortunate to have had him; that he
deserved to be a Field Marshal; and that he didn’t deserve to be
so ill appreciated.
The Author:
Gordon
Maitland is a member of the Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey
Memorial Fund; and a past-president and current councilor of the
Institution. A former citizen-soldier, he joined the Army in 1944.
He eventually rose to command the 2nd Division and
become Chief of the Army Reserve, before becoming Regimental
Colonel of the Royal New South Wales Regiment. In civil life, he
was a senior executive of the Agricultural Society of New South
Wales. He is a noted military historian whose published works
include Tales of Valour from the Royal New South Wales Regiment
(1992); The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle
Honours (1999); and the two-volume The Battle History of the Royal
New South Wales Regiment, (Volume 1, 2001; Volume 2, 2002).
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